中国金融倾斜加速器效应的计量检验与博弈分析  

Econometric Test and Game Analysis of China's Financial Tilt Accelerator Effects

作　　者：田树喜[1] 白钦先[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学文法学院,辽宁沈阳110004 [2]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《上海金融》2009年第7期5-11,共7页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"虚拟经济与经济虚拟性"的阶段性成果(项目批准号:70573042)

摘　　要：基于融资结构变迁的视角,"金融倾斜"特指间接融资与直接融资两种融资方式的不平衡发展,而金融倾斜极易引发一国经济的非对称波动。本文的计量检验表明,中国的金融倾斜具有强烈的亲周期特征,且引发了"小冲击,大波动"的金融加速器效应。本文的博弈分析表明,在国家的隐性担保下,企业经理人的最优策略是通过膨胀前期会计资产来瓜分"红利",并将国有银行捆绑为"人质",因此,中央政府的"清理"策略往往引发经济的剧烈波动。In the perspective of financing structure evolution, financial tilt is referred to as the imbalance between indirect financing and direct financing, which could easily trigger asymmetric economic fluctuation. The result of econometric test reveals that China＇s financial tilt is pro-cyclic, thus resulting in financial accelerator effect. Game analysis shows that the optimal strategy for professional managers is to sacrifice state banks for their own interest. Therefore, the central government＇s policy would lead to intense oscillation.

关 键 词：金融倾斜 H-P滤波 EGARCH模型 金融加速器 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]