配股政策的经济后果研究  

Economical Effect of Pre-SEO and Pro-SEO Pegulations

作　　者：徐军辉[1] 王华[2] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学公共管理学院 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510630

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2009年第7期102-105,161,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文将配股政策分为大股东认购比例、配股比例、治理结构、股利政策、投资政策五个方面,采用OLS模型、Logistic模型检验政策对企业行为特征及经营绩效的影响进行了分析研究。结果发现:配股比例高的企业融资后业绩更差;大股东认购可以明显减少企业的业绩下滑;无论什么原因造成的资金用途变更,均会造成企业业绩的显著下滑;配股后发放股利的企业比不发放股利的企业业绩好;关联交易、大股东资金侵占对企业产生负面影响。By partitioning off pre-SEO and pro-SEO regulations to five aspects :subscribing rate for dominant stakeholders,issuing rate,corporate governance structure,dividend policy and investment policy,this paper analysis the effect of rules on companies actions and tests those actions'influence on SEO performance by referring to OLS Models,Logistic Models. All of the empirical results support alternation of government regulation policy in view of enterprises performance,that is to say,companies with high issue rate have a worse performance. Underperformance can be lessened if dominant stakeholders subscript shares. All investment alternations lead to performance drop no matter what cause it. Companies that pay cash dividend have better performance. Affiliated business and entrenchment effect by dominant stakeholders have negative effect on corporations. The result of our research is meaningful for market regulation.

关 键 词：政府监管 配股 配股企业行为 经营绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]