大股东“隧道挖掘”:相互制衡还是竞争性合谋--基于“股权分置”背景下中国上市公司的经验研究  

Tunneling of Large Shareholders:Co-Monitoring or Competitive Colluding?

作　　者：刘慧龙[1] 陆勇[1] 宋乐[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2009年第1期97-112,共16页China Accounting Review

摘　　要：其他大股东与第一大股东在隧道挖掘问题上是相互制衡还是竞争性合谋?本文认为他们既有可能"相互制衡",也可能"竞争性合谋"。当其他大股东对第一大股东制衡能力较高时,他们之间倾向于"竞争性合谋",随着其他大股东对第一大股东制衡能力减弱,他们之间的关系从"竞争性合谋"趋向于"相互制衡"。本文从资金占用、现金持有价值与公司业绩和公司价值这三个层面,检验了上述理论分析,统计证据支持了我们的推测。Tunneling of Large Shareholders is a very important issue on studying of Chinese listed companies. The Split Share Structure has great effect on the tunneling incentives of large shareholders. We document that the first shareholder tends to collude with other large shareholders to tunnel resources from the company when shareholding gap between them is small, however, along with shareholding gap becoming larger, the relationship between them shifts from competitive colluding to co-monitoring.

关 键 词：股权制衡 合谋 掏空 公司业绩 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]