思想实验的认识论问题  

Thought Experiments and Its Epistemic Questions

作　　者：王华平[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学语言与认知研究中心,浙江杭州310028

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2009年第4期25-30,共6页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：哲学和自然科学中都不乏思想实验的例子。但即使思想实验是公认地有效的,也还存在它何以能让我们免于经验的输入就可以获得关于世界的新知识,以及这种知识又是如何得到辩护的认识论问题。作者的观点是,一方面,思想实验很好地体现了发现的逻辑,因而能让我们通过有效地重组以往的经验而获得新知识;另一方面,思想实验的有效性就在于它作为一个论证的有效性。There are varieties of thought experiments both in natural science and in philosophy.Nevertheless,even thought experiments are admittedly valid,there are still such epistemic questions as how they can let us gain new knowledge about world while dispensing with experiential inputs,and as how new knowledge can be justified.In this article,the author argues that thought experiments on the one hand reify the logic of discovery,thus let us gain new knowledge via helping us validly recomposing old experience;on the other hand,they are valid just because they can be reformed to sound arguments.

关 键 词：思想实验 论证 发现的情境 辩护的情境 

分 类 号：B506[哲学宗教—外国哲学]