奖励还是惩罚:金融企业控制操作失误的激励机制研究  

Encouragement or Punishment:A Study of Incentive Mechanism Preventing Operational Mistakes in Financial Enterprise

作　　者：赵蕾[1] 张庆洪[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外贸易学院金融管理学院,上海201620 [2]同济大学中德学院,天津200092

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2009年第4期133-138,共6页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金;上海市教委重点学科金融学建设项目(项目编号:J512-01)资助

摘　　要：一些操作风险研究者曾提出对产生失误但上报事故的员工应给予免责以代替惩戒。一些国际金融机构的相关尝试至今还没有取得完全令人满意的经验。究竟什么样的激励机制是有效的,奖励还是惩罚?本文建立了一个双重目标的控制操作失误的激励机制模型,并用博弈论理论进行了分析。该模型理论上的帕累托最优是一种"胡萝卜加大棒"的组合策略。实务中可操作的次优工资策略是对于不同类型的操作失误事故根据其审计难度与可能造成的损失、延误处置导致的损失增加、可能的最大处罚等之间的关系设计不同的激励工资契约。Some experts of operational risk management put forward that financial enterprise should provide indemnity against disciplinary proceedings to those who caused and reported events. The experiences of several international enterprises so far have not been completely satisfactory. Which incentive mechanism is more effective, rewards or punishments？ A dual-purpose incentive mechanism model for operational mistakes control was constructed, and was analyzed with the game theory. The theoretical Pareto dominance of the model is a system of ＂carrot-and-stick＂. The second best exercisable salary policy are diverse salary policies made according to each kind of mistakes and the relationships between its hardness of audit, possible loss, increase in loss caused by delay disposition and possibly maximum fine.

关 键 词：操作失误 激励机制 控制 金融企业 委托代理 

分 类 号：F16[经济管理—世界经济]