家族控股、终极所有权与企业绩效——来自我国上市公司的经验证据  

Family Governance,Ultimate Property Rights and Firm Performance:Evidence from Listed-Companies in China

作　　者：石水平[1] 石本仁[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《财贸研究》2009年第4期110-117,共8页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国家族企业信息传递机制研究"(70572064);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"财权;财务制度与新<企业财务通则>实施──基于中央国有企业的问卷调查"(08JA630030);国务院侨办青年课题"我国新创侨资企业持续成长与侨务政策研究--基于社会资本融合的分析"(GQBQ2009031)的阶段性研究成果;暨南大学会计学系育题基金的资助

摘　　要：借鉴Driffield等(2007)的研究方法,运用终极产权论追踪上市公司的终极控股股东,分析我国家族企业金字塔结构下的控股股东和终极所有权对企业绩效的影响。研究发现:第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,第二至五大股东持股比例之和与企业绩效呈U型关系;家族上市公司的企业绩效与家族控股股东的控制权负相关,与现金流权正相关,与超控制权负相关;另外,家族上市公司的企业绩效与是否委派管理层负相关,与董事长与总经理是否合一负相关。同时,按家族控股股东的控制权大小分组检验也得到了类似的结论。Through referencing the research method of Driffield et al. （2007） and using ultimate property rights to track ultimate controlling shareholders of listed-companies, this paper analyzes the affection of controlling shareholders and ultimate ownership to firm performance under family pyramid structure. The results show that the fast large-shareholder has a pour U type relation with firm performance while the 2ed-5th large-shareholders have an U type relation with firm performance. The firm performance of family listedcompanies has a negative relation with control rights of family controlling, a positive relation with cash flow rights and a negative relation with excessive control rights. Furthermore, the firm performance has a negative relation with whether or not controlling＇ shareholder appoints to management layer and whether CEO unites as one or not with president. The test of the family controlling shareholder on control rights size also get similar conclusion, which provides the referent function on the family business governance and establishment of information delivery mechanism for our country.

关 键 词：家族治理 金字塔结构 现金流权 超控制权 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]