“一控多”公司:实证分析与理论解释  

The Pyramids: Empirical Analysis and Theoretical Explanations

作　　者：胡经生[1] 

机构地区：[1]深圳证券交易所综合研究所,广东深圳518028

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2009年第8期51-58,共8页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：本文利用2005年数据系统考察了沪深股市"一控多"现象,分析了"一控多"的成因、控制结构与业绩之间的关系等。研究发现,沪深两市1999年后"一控多"大量涌现的原因,在于非流通股场外低价协议转让等条件下,大批民营企业在构筑内部资本市场以融资、二级市场获利、产业整合等动机驱使下形成的。金字塔式控制结构对上市公司经营业绩有显著负面影响,且在民营"一控多"上市公司表现更显著。全流通环境下,"一控多"现象在中短期减少的趋势不明朗,仍然潜藏着问题和风险。建议通过综合监管体系,强化信息披露监管,实施动态、差异化、合作监管,发挥外部监督力量等措施加强对"一控多"的监管。Using the cross-sectional data of 2005 this paper studies the origin, the controlling structure and performance of pyramids in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock markets. It is found that the reason why pyramids burgeoned after 1999 is that the a horde of non-state owned enterprises construct internal financing market so as to finance, to profit from secondary market, or conduct industrial integration, which is especially the case for the non-state owned enterprises. In the circumstance of full circulation, there are no descending trends for the pyramids and the potential problems and risks are still essential. It is suggested that the multi-layer invigilation be established, and the information disclosure should be strengthened. Various measures, such as dynamic invigilation, differentiation, external invigilation should be conducted.

关 键 词：“一控多” 协议转让 内部资本市场 公司监管 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]