INFORMATION SHARING AND STRATEGIC SIGNALING IN SUPPLY CHAINS  

作　　者：Robert J.KAUFFMAN Hamid MOHTADI 

机构地区：[1]W.P.Carey School of Business,and School of Computing and Informatics,Arizona State University Tempe,AZ,85287 USA [2]Department of Economics,University of Wisconsin,Milwaukee,WI,53201 and Credit Risk Assessment,USBank,Minneapolis,MN,55402,USA

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》2009年第2期129-158,共30页系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）

基　　金：the MIS Research Center of the University of Minnesota for partial support;the W.P.Carey Chair at the W.P.Carey School of Business,Arizona State University,Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management,and the Shidler School of Business at theUniversity of Hawaii for the funding of some research activities related to this work

摘　　要：Information sharing in procurement occurs in rich and varied industry contexts in which managerial decisions are made and organizational strategy is formulated. We explore how information sharing ought to work in procurement contexts that involve investments in inter-organizational information systems （IOS） and collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment （CPFR） practices. How and under what circumstances does a firm that plays the role of a supply chain buyer decide to share information on key variables, such as point-of-sale consumer demand data with its supplier, up the supply chain？ This is a key issue that crosses the boundary between supply chain management and information systems （IS） management. The answers that we provide are based on our use of a game-theoretic signaling model of buyer and supplier strategy in the presence of uncertainties about final consumer demand. We also explore the connection between operational costs that are associated with the firm＇s information sharing and information withholding strategies. Our results provide normative guidance to supply chain buyers about how to interpret different demand uncertainty scenarios to improve their decisions and generate high value. From the IS management perspective, we show the impacts on the firm of different information sharing approaches that are made possible by present day technologies.Information sharing in procurement occurs in rich and varied industry contexts in which managerial decisions are made and organizational strategy is formulated. We explore how information sharing ought to work in procurement contexts that involve investments in inter-organizational information systems （IOS） and collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment （CPFR） practices. How and under what circumstances does a firm that plays the role of a supply chain buyer decide to share information on key variables, such as point-of-sale consumer demand data with its supplier, up the supply chain？ This is a key issue that crosses the boundary between supply chain management and information systems （IS） management. The answers that we provide are based on our use of a game-theoretic signaling model of buyer and supplier strategy in the presence of uncertainties about final consumer demand. We also explore the connection between operational costs that are associated with the firm＇s information sharing and information withholding strategies. Our results provide normative guidance to supply chain buyers about how to interpret different demand uncertainty scenarios to improve their decisions and generate high value. From the IS management perspective, we show the impacts on the firm of different information sharing approaches that are made possible by present day technologies.

关 键 词：Anticipated over-supply collaborative planning forecasting and replenishment （CPFR） demand forecasting economic analysis information sharing information systems （IS） SIGNALING supply chain management 

分 类 号：TP399-C2[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]