延期支付条件下的供应链信用风险声誉激励机制  

The Reputation Incentive Mechanism of the Credit Risk in the Supply Chain under Permissible Delay in Payments

作　　者：钟敏[1,2] 马可[1] 杨华[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学,天津300072 [2]军事交通学院,天津300161

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第4期33-35,共3页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家863/CIMS主题资助项目(2007AA04Z115)

摘　　要：针对供应链采用延期支付契约后由于付款时间和交货时间不同而产生的信用风险,从供应商的角度,分三种情况(零售商还款时间小于供应商所给予的延期支付期限、零售商的还款时间介于延期支付期限和供应商所能忍受的最大支付时间之间、零售商的还款时间大于供应商所能忍受的最大支付时间)进行讨论,研究了供应链信用风险的声誉激励机制。研究结果表明:提高供应商对零售商声誉的认可程度以及提高贴现因子,可以有效地激励零售商完成还款。This paper discusses the reputation incentive mechanism in the supply chain from the supplier＇s point of view. in three aspects, In order to explain the credit risk aroused by the time difference between the payment and the delivery after the permissible delay in payments were applied in the supply chain, it, from the angle of suppliers, discusses the following three situations： the retailer paid within the credit period, the retailer paid beyond the credit period, but the supplier could still bear, the retailer paid beyond the degree that the supplier could bear. The result shows that the retailer could be inspired efficiently by increasing the two factors, that is, the reputation level that the supplier thought the retail belonged to and the discount factor.

关 键 词：供应链 延期支付 信用风险 声誉激励机制 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]