销售绩效的博弈分析与激励契约  

Gambling Analysis and Incentive Contract of Sales Performance

作　　者：冯立超[1] 武志辉[2] 郭小强[1] 郑石秋[1] 刘秋梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北理工大学理学院,河北唐山063009 [2]哈尔滨理工大学应用科学学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《河北理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第5期43-45,49,共4页Journal of Hebei Polytechnic University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：企业销售人员基于自身利益的驱动会产生道德风险行为,道德风险严重地阻碍了企业的发展。运用不完全信息动态博弈理论和委托-代理理论,建立了防范道德风险的博弈模型,定量地讨论了均衡状态下的最优博弈策略,并给出了基于最优博弈策略促使销售人员努力完成销售任务的激励契约。In corporation, salesman would have the moral hazard behavior in view of his own benefit, and the moral hazard behavior has hindered the development of corporation seriously. Using incomplete information dynamic gamble theory and principal-agent theory, this paper has founded the gambling model which guard against moral hazard, and has discussed optimal gambling strategy under the equilibrium state quantitatively. At last, the incentive contract based on optimal gambling strategy, which urges salesman to finish sales task diligently, is given.

关 键 词：销售人员 道德风险 博弈策略 委托-代理原理 激励契约 绩效 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F406