公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用研究  

Corporate Transparency and Expropriation by Large Shareholders

作　　者：王克敏[1] 姬美光[2] 李薇[3] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院 [2]吉林大学管理学院 [3]中国银行天津分行

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2009年第4期83-91,共9页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872023;70632002);2006年教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(06JA630016);教育部留学回国人员科研启动基金资助项目;上海市浦江人才计划;2008年度上海市社科规划项目(2008BJB019)资助

摘　　要：本文以2002-2006年非金融类的中国A股上市公司为研究对象,分析了公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用之间的关系。研究发现,在控制其它影响因素条件下,公司信息透明度越差,大股东资金占用问题越严重。该研究结论表明,提高公司信息透明度将有助于改善大股东与中小股东之间的信息不对称,缓解二者之间的代理冲突,减少大股东资金占用的可能性。At the beginning of this century, several famous American companies such as Enron and WorldCom experienced financial scandals. The world was shocked that public companies disclosed untruthful financial information to outside stakeholders. As a transitional economy, the ownership structure of listed firms in China is very concentrated. Corporate transparency levels are also very low. Controlling shareholders often take advantage of their controlling rights to exploit minority shareholders. This is quite common in the Chinese stock market. Using data on nonfinancial listed firms from between 2002 and 2006, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate transparency and large shareholder expropriation of listed companies＇ funds. We find that corporate transparency is significantly related to large shareholder expropriation of listed companies＇ funds. The more aggressive the earnings, and the more opaque the overall earnings, the more severe is large shareholder expropriation of listed companies＇ funds. After controlling for other factors, corporate transparency is still a very important factor which is negatively related to the expropriation of funds by large shareholders. The results suggest that, as an important component of corporate governance mechanisms, the enhancement of corporate transparency will not only decrease information asymmetry and mitigate agency conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders, but also facilitate minority shareholders to monitor large shareholder behavior and reduce the probability of expropriation of funds by large shareholders. After robust tests, in which we use information disclosure rates from the Shenzhen stock exchange and expropriation data from the Shanghai stock exchange, the above results are confirmed.

关 键 词：信息透明度 大股东 资金占用 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]