国际战略联盟类型选择的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Type Selection of International Strategic Alliance

作　　者：陈学梅[1] 孟卫东[1] 胡大江[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2009年第16期6-9,共4页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

摘　　要：国际战略联盟类型影响联盟绩效及其稳定发展。以合作偏好度作为选择构建联盟类型的依据,分别考虑无形收益和不考虑无形收益,建立了合作偏好度的演化博弈模型,并由此分析联盟类型的选择:不考虑无形收益,则构建纵向联盟,且演化稳定的合作偏好度随产品互补性增加而增强;考虑无形收益,构建横向或纵向联盟皆可,但需调节自己的合作偏好度,以影响对方的合作偏好度,从而促进联盟的稳定发展。The performance and stale development of international strategic alliance is influenced by the type of international strategic alliance. Altruistic preferences is the basis to choose the type of alliance, considering intangible benefits or not considering the intangible benefits.It builds the evolutionary game model of altruistic preferences,and analyses the chose of the type of alliance：if not considering intangible benefits,then builds vertical alliance, and the ESS of the altruistic preference is increased with the complementary of products ;if considering intangible benefits, then building horizontal or vertical alliance are both ok,but can adjust their own altruist preference to affect the other＇s preference and to promote the development of alliance.

关 键 词：国际战略联盟 演化稳定策略 无形收益 合作偏好度 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]