区域经济一体化中的地方政府间竞争——基于不完全信息博弈模型分析  

The Local Governments' Competition Game Behavior under the Integration of Regional Economics——An Analysis from the View of a Bargaining Model of Incomplete Information

作　　者：李江[1] 李素萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学经济学院,四川成都610064 [2]石河子大学商学院,新疆五家渠831300

出　　处：《城市发展研究》2009年第8期97-100,105,共5页Urban Development Studies

摘　　要：在我国区域经济一体化进程中,地方政府日益成为具有独立利益和决策权利的经济主体,地方政府之间的关系成为协调区域发展的重要因素和衡量指标之一。本文在经典博弈模型分析基础上,引入不完全信息博弈模型,进一步分析地方政府在对抗竞争和合作竞争中的不同决策和不同收益,探讨地方政府行为中出现的合作博弈和非合作博弈倾向,并对产生博弈行为的原因和影响进行研究,在此基础上提出了地方政府"合作博弈"、谋求共同发展的建议。Under the integration of regional economics, how to balance the development of parallel local governments have become a hot issue and a key measure to reflect the administration capacity and efficiency of central government. In the process of the integration of regional economics, local governments have gradually become the economic subjects of independent interests and decisive rights. This article studies the local governments＇ different decisions and achievements in antagonistic competition and cooperative competition from the view of game theory, and analyzes the existing trend of local governments cooperative and non-cooperative game intention by a mutual bargaining model with incomplete information, based on a deep research into the root of such gaming activities as well as the negative impact they already have on the integrated regional common interests. Finally, the article arrives at some conclusions and puts forwards relevant suggestions.

关 键 词：区域经济一体化 地方政府 博弈 

分 类 号：F12[经济管理—世界经济]