政府干预对市场声誉机制的挤出效应——中国医疗保障制度改革的逻辑  

AThe Crowding-out Effect of the Government Intervention to the Market Reputation Mechanism The Logic of China＇s Medical Insurance System＇ s Reform

作　　者：潘常刚[1] 吕国营[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学公共管理学院,湖北武汉430060

出　　处：《中国医药技术经济与管理》2009年第8期78-82,共5页China Pharmaceutical Technology Economics & Management

基　　金：本文系赵曼教授主持的国家自然科学基金资助项目《监管、自律与医生道德风险规避》（批准号：70673114）的阶段性研究成果.

摘　　要：监管和自律是克服医生道德风险的两种主要途径，但是政府对医疗领域的过度干预会挤占市场声誉机制的发展空间，同时也进一步强化了医生的道德风险。改革现行“管办不分”的医疗卫生体制以及医院等级评定和医生职称评定制度，同时放松政府对医疗服务价格的控制，以恢复被扭曲的医疗供方市场声誉机制。The supervision and the Self-discipline are two main ways to overcome the moral hazard of doctors. But the excessive intervention to the medical domain of the government can occupy the market growth space of the reputation mechanism. Meantime, it will also strengthen the doctor＇s moral hazard. The reforms of the current Medical and health system of ＂indistinction between fuactions of execution and those of administration＂ , the hospital rating system and the doctor＇ s job appraisal system, simultaneously relaxing the control of the government to the medical service price, are the ways to restore the market reputation mechanism of the medical supply-side which is distorted.

关 键 词：医疗保障制度改革 政府干预 市场 逻辑 中国 职称评定制度 医院等级评定 医疗卫生体制 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理] R199.2[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学]