移动商务竞价行为的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡研究  

Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium-based Bargaining Behavior Research in Mobile Commerce

作　　者：曾庆群[1] 章德宾[1] 胡斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2009年第4期617-620,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70731001)

摘　　要：研究了移动商务环境下企业竞价决策行为的贝叶斯纳什均衡问题。企业间信息不对称导致价格博弈成为决定最终购买的重要因素。将移动商务下企业产品竞价过程视为一个信息不完全条件下的动态博弈过程,首先分析了企业购买行为中所涉及的基本信息及其抽象表示,对进行博弈分析的基本假设进行定义,然后引入自然人对目标企业收益不确定性进行贝叶斯先验概率设定,在此基础上对购买竞价过程进行精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡解研究,从而得到移动商务竞价行为的博弈均衡解。Bayesian Nash Equilibrium- based Bargaining Behavior Bargaining behaviors in mobile commerce were researched. The pricing bargaining process between enterprises＇ products in mobile commerce was regarded as a dynamic game process under an imperfect information condition. The basic information and their abstract expression were studied. The basic assumption to make game analysis was defined. The nature was introduced to decide the objeet＇s benefit based on Bayesian beliefs. On this basis,the process of pricing bargaining was researched with perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium theory. The corresponding resolutions in mobile commerce pricing bargain was obtained.

关 键 词：博弈 贝叶斯纳什均衡 移动商务 行为研究 

分 类 号：TP391[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] C936[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]