零售商主导的短生命周期产品供应链订货策略  

Game analysis of ordering strategy based on short life-cycle products in a retailer dominated supply chain

作　　者：徐贤浩[1] 聂思玥[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2009年第4期83-93,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472059);国家高技术研究发展计划资助项目(2006AA04Z153)

摘　　要：针对短生命周期产品的特点,探讨了当零售商为供应链的核心主导商时,由供应商和零售商构成的短生命周期产品二级供应链的订货决策模型.当零售商占主导地位时,零售商则会通过竞价手段将供应商的产品订购价格压制在比较低的水平,并且根据供应商的报价来选择向其订货的数量.同时由于零售商直接面临消费群体,因而可以通过增加营销信号帮助供应商消除产品积压的现象.运用博弈论来分析供应链中各利益主体在不同条件下的决策与利益分配关系,并以契约方式提出了有效的激励措施,最后进行了算例分析和验证.Based on the characteristics of short life-cycle dominated supply chain is discussed by using game theory products, the In the retailer is a core enterprise in the supply chain. Therefore, retailer can suppress ordering decision model of retailer dominated supply chain, the retailer products prices of suppliers to a low price through the tactics of product price competition of suppliers. After that, the retailer can decide its ordering quantity according to the quoted price proposed by suppliers. Meanwhile, retailer can also use marketing information to help suppliers to eliminate the overstocks of their products. In this paper, the strategy and the distribution of interests of every participant are analyzed in different conditions by using game theory, and an efficient incentive measures are developed. At last, an example is given to validate the conclusions of the model in the paper.

关 键 词：短生命周期产品 供应链 订货策略 博弈 激励 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]