代建高速公路业主与代建人的委托代理关系  

Principal-agent Relationship of Owner and Construction Agent of Substitute Expressway

作　　者：杨琦[1] 

机构地区：[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064

出　　处：《中国公路学报》2009年第5期105-110,共6页China Journal of Highway and Transport

基　　金：陕西省社会科学基金项目(07E006Z);陕西省交通科技项目(06-03R)

摘　　要：介绍了代建制工程项目管理模式的内涵和信息经济学中委托代理理论的基本逻辑,分析了代建高速公路业主与代建人的委托代理问题,构建了业主与代建人的委托代理基本模型并进行了改进。分析结果表明:可以将激励与监督机制有机地结合起来,一同纳入高速公路代建合同的设计中;激励与监督机制都能诱导或激发出代建人的努力;增加固定报酬对代建人的努力没有激励作用,但固定报酬是高速公路业主与代建人达成合作契约的前提;产出分享份额与监控信号在代建合同的制定中是相互关联的;监督措施会对代建人产生负面影响,高速公路业主可能需要补偿由于采用这些监督措施而引起代建人的效用损失。Connotation of management mode for agent-construction project and basic logic of principal-agent theory in information economics were introduced. Principal-agent relationship of owner and construction agent of substitute expressway was analyzed. Basic principal-agent model between owner and construction agent was established and it was improved. Analysis results show that incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can be organically combined. Both of them should be brought into agent-construction contract. Incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism can stimulate effort of construction agent. Increase of fixed remuneration has no incentive effects on effort of construction agent. However, fixed remuneration is precondition of agreement of owner and construction agent of substitute expressway. Productive share relates to minitoring signal in agent-construction contract. Supervision measures can cause negative effect on construction agent. Owner of expressway probably need to compensate avail loss of construction agent caused by supervision measures.

关 键 词：公路运输经济 代建高速公路业主 委托代理理论 代建人 激励机制 监督机制 

分 类 号：F540[经济管理—产业经济]