经营者股权激励、约束水平与公司业绩——基于民营上市公司的实证分析  

Managers' Ownership Incentive,Restriction Level and Enterprises' performance——Empirical Analysis Based on the Private Listed Companies

作　　者：李斌[1] 孙月静[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国软科学》2009年第8期119-131,共13页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家软科学规划项目(2007GXS3D104);辽宁省社科基金项目(L07DJL031);辽宁省教育厅项目(2008191);辽宁省高等学校优秀人才支持计划(2009R21)

摘　　要：在保持公司特征同质性的基础上,本文选取民营公司作为研究对象,使用主成分构建对经营者的约束水平。综合考虑约束水平对股权激励的影响,细分董事长和总经理的激励情况进行实证分析。同时结合经营者激励约束的数学模型分析认为:国内民营上市公司对经营者的股权激励能发挥激励效果,但激励强度有待加强;对经营者的股权激励与约束水平能彼此增强各自对公司业绩的影响,但实证结果并不显著。On the base of the same characters, we choose private companies as the object of analysis, construct the restriction level about the managers by principal component analysis method. The empirical analysis is based on integrating the restriction＇s impact on the stock incentive and the division of stock incentive of board chairman and general manager. Meanwhile we combine the mathematics model of incentive including restriction. We find ： Managers＇ ownership incentive has the positive effect, but the incentive＇ s intensity should be increased ; stock incentive and restriction level can increase the opposite effect on enterprises＇ performance each other, while the empirical conclusion isn＇t significant.

关 键 词：经营者 股权激励 约束水平 激励约束模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]