中国上市公司利益输送行为研究——基于非流通股协议转让与限售股转让的证据  

The Study of Tunneling in China's Listed Companies——Evidence from the Non-Tradable Shares Transfer and Restricted Shares Transfer

作　　者：于静[1] 陈工孟[1] 孙彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《软科学》2009年第9期102-106,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(70503015)

摘　　要：基于非流通股协议转让交易的样本和限售股协议转让交易的样本,实证检验了股改前后上市公司的利益输送行为。发现对于非流通股协议转让的样本,控制权、机构投资者持股比例、董事会规模、审计意见和每股收益都会加重上市公司的利益输送行为;控制权性质、法制水平和总资产报酬率能抑制上市公司的利益输送行为。对于限售股的样本,控制权、两权分离度、控制权性质、总资产报酬率、资产负债率加重了上市公司的利益输送。而现金流权、机构投资者持股比例、董事会规模、审计意见、每股收益能够削弱上市公司的利益输送水平。此外,股权分置改革的实施从一定程度上减弱了利益输送行为,并具有一定的解释力量。Based on the sample of the non - tradable shares transfer and restricted shares transfer, the paper analyzes the tunneling before and after the non - tradable share reform. It finds that, to the sample of the non - tradable shares transfer, control right, institution share, board size, audit opinion and earnings per share can aggravates tunneling; control right property, law level and return on total assets ratio can restrain tunneling. To the sample of the restricted shares transfer, control right, separation of ownership and control rights, control right property, return on total assets ratio and asset - liability ratio can exacerbate tunneling. But ownership right, institution share, board size, audit opinion and earnings per share can reduce tunneling. Besides, non - tradable share reform can weaken and explain tunneling to some extent.

关 键 词：非流通股 限售股 股权分置改革 利益输送 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]