基于滞销品处理成本与效率的退货政策研究  

Research on Return Policy Based on the Disposal Cost and Efficiency of the Dead Stock

作　　者：魏玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2009年第5期76-81,共6页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(10426011);黑龙江省青年科学与技术专项基金(QC07C116)

摘　　要：为了更好地满足顾客需求,谋求企业的长远发展,供应链上的所有企业应该协作起来,采取一定的策略协调彼此的行动,使每个成员考虑自身行动对其他成员的影响而做出使整个供应链系统最优的决策,解决由制造商与一个零售商构成的分布式供应链定价订购决策问题。在制造商作为Stackelberg博弈中的领导者站在供应链整体的角度,考虑到退货成本和处理滞销品效率,建立退货政策模型,研究实现供应链协调和双赢的条件。在退货政策不适用时,用滞销补贴契约来代替退货政策,以实现供应链的协调,并且运用数值分析的方法分析它对双方利润改善率的影响,为供应链成员提供可以实现双赢的多种方案。For satisfying customers＇needs well and seeking a long - term development, an the enterprises belonging to the same supply chain should collaborate and take some strategies to coordinate their actions. These strategies should make each supply chain member take the impact of its own actions on the other members into account and make decisions which are optimal for the whole supply chain system. In this supply chain, the manufacturer acts as the leader of the Stackelberg game and makes decisions for the whole supply chain benefits. Considering the return cost and the disposal efficiency of the dead stock, the model of the return policy should be established and the implementation conditions of the supply chain coordination and the two - win should be studied. When the return policy is not applicable, this paper suggests using markdown money contract instead of the return policy to coordinate the supply chain. This paper also suggests using numerical analysis method to analyse its impact on the improved profit rates of both sides, a variety of programs which can achieve a two - win situation for members in the supply chain is provided.

关 键 词：供应链契约 STACKELBERG博弈 退货政策 滞销补贴 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济] C931.1[经济管理—管理学]