国有产权交易中寻租行为的防范策略研究——行为金融视角的三方博弈分析  

A Research on Strategies of the Rent Seeking Prevention in the State-owned Property Rights Exchange——A Three Party Gaming Analysis from the Behavioral Finance Aspect

作　　者：李延喜[1] 魏国强[1] 薛光[1] 张波涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第10期66-71,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：辽宁省社科基金(L06BJY011);辽宁省博士科研启动基金(1050354)

摘　　要：文章分析了国有产权交易过程中相关利益群体的行为取向,构建了基于前景理论的监管者、代理人和购买者三方博弈模型,并求得混合战略的纳什均衡解,得到监管者的最优监管概率。在此基础上对监管者、代理人和购买者的行为特征及策略进行分析,提出监管者应该针对具有不同行为特征的代理人和购买者在最优监管概率下采取最优监管强度进行监管。The behavior tendency of the related interest group during the property rights exchange process is analyzed. Basing on the prospect theory, the paper proposes a trilateral game model including the supervisor, the agent and the purchaser, also finds out the Nash equilibrium solution in the mixed strategy and the best supervisory probability of the supervisor. The paper gives an analysis of the behaviors and strategies of the supervisor, the agent and the purchaser, and suggests the supervision should be directed against agents and purchasers according to their different behaviors.

关 键 词：产权制度改革 前景理论 博弈 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]