服务水平敏感时的Internet直销商与零售商竞争  

Nash Equilibrium between Direct Marketer and Conventional Retailers under Customer Service Sensitivity

作　　者：李培勤[1] 黄培清[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2009年第5期8-13,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772065;70732003);上海市哲学社会科学课题(2008BJB032);国家自然科学基金青年基金(70802041)

摘　　要：探讨了在综合服务水平支付意愿系数不同的情况下,Internet直销商和传统零售商之间Nash均衡解的存在条件,得出结论,Internet直销商的最优收益单调递减。通过数值分析得出,市场共享比例的增大会提升Internet直销商的最优收益,而零售商的最优收益则会下降。Based on a circular market,an Internet direct marketer and multiple conventional retailers who are located at equal distances from each other on the circumference. The retailer＇s costs are higher than direct marketer such as store＇s rents, customer service, etc. At the same time,the direct marketer＇s friction costs affect its competition such as poor qualities, etc. This paper finds out Nash equilibrium between the direct marketer and one conventional retailer under different integrative coefficient of willing to pay for customer service,and it concludes that as the coefficient increasing, the Internet direct marketer~ s optimal revenue becomes descending. By numerical analysis, the paper finds that as market coverage increasing, the Internet marketer＇ s optimal revenue becomes bigger. However, the retailer＇s optimal revenue is descending.

关 键 词：圆形市场 NASH均衡 Internet直销商 传统零售商 综合服务水平支付意愿系数 市场共享比例 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]