经理、股东及政府税收的最优策略分析  

Optimal Tax Policy Analysis for the Trade-off among Manager,Shareholder and Government Revenue

作　　者：张荣[1] 付宪法[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《工业工程》2009年第5期1-6,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771118)

摘　　要：在一定的假设下构造了经理、股东和政府之间的主从微分对策模型,政府在对策中充当主者,股东和经理作为两个从者。利用极大值原理和倒向微分方程,研究分析了三者之间互动的理性行为,并且对均衡解的经济含义进行了解释。Under some proper assumptions, a leader-follower differential game model is presented to describe the relationship among manager, shareholder,and government. In the model,the government acts as a leader, manager and shareholder as followers. With this model, by using Pontryagin＇ s maximum principle and backward differential equations,the rational interactions among them are analyzed and a different equilibrium solution can be obtained,which is the optimal tax policy. Economical implications of this solution are given.

关 键 词：主从微分对策 极大值原理 税收策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]