需求预测信息不对称下电子渠道与零售商合作策略研究  

Cooperation strategy between electronic channels and retailers under asymmetric demand information environment

作　　者：肖剑[1,2] 但斌[1] 张旭梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学数理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2009年第10期2017-2022,共6页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972056);国家863计划资助项目(2007AA040801);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-05-0769)~~

摘　　要：在双渠道供应链中,利用零售商贴近顾客的特点,制造商把电子渠道的订单交由零售商来完成,并根据订单数目给予零售商补贴。在需求不确定情形下,用主从博弈和贝叶斯方法对此现象进行研究,发现制造商调高其需求规模预测值将导致电子渠道和零售渠道的价格升高,电子渠道的需求减少,而制造商给予零售商的单位补贴与电子渠道和零售渠道的价格正相关,与电子渠道的需求负相关,但不影响零售渠道的需求。利用数值算例,分析了电子渠道的市场份额、制造商和零售商对需求的预测误差、相关系数等对制造商和零售商收益的影响。In dual-channel supply chain, retailers were close to the customers, manufacturers outsourced its＇ distribution of electronic channels to retailers and retailers got subsidies from manufacturers according to the order volume of electronic channels. Under uncertain demand, this phenomenon was studied by Stackelberg game and Bayesian methods. Study results showed that if manufacturers were optimistic about future demand, the price of electronic channels and retail channels would be increased, and the demand of electronic channels reduced. Retailers＇ units subsidies given by manufacturers were positively associated with the price of electronic channels and retail channels, and were negatively related to the demand of electronic channels, but has no influence on the demand of retail channel. With numerical examples, the influencing factors of manufacturers and retailers＇ profit were analyzed, such as the market share of electronic channels, demand forecast error of manufacturers and retailers, the correlation coefficient, etc.

关 键 词：双渠道 供应链 电子渠道 零售商 主从博弈 贝叶斯方法 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]