上市公司内部治理机制防范管理舞弊的有效性分析——基于中国证券市场的经验证据  

Analysis of the Effectiveness of Internal Governance of Listed Companies for the Prevention of Management Fraud——Evidence from Chinese Security Market

作　　者：王泽霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学财经学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2009年第10期143-146,149,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"管理舞弊审计理论创新与应用研究"(项目批准号:70372067)的后续研究成果

摘　　要：本文从股权结构、董事会和监事会的独立性、积极性、监控能力和运行机制等方面实证考察了公司内部治理机制与管理舞弊的相关度。研究表明:第一大股东委派的监事比例、监事持股比例和监事列席董事会会议的频率与管理舞弊显著负相关,既监事比例、监事持股比例和监事列席董事会会议的频率较高的情况下公司内部治理机制较为有效;两职状态、地方政府的国有股国家委派外部董事比例、第一大股东所派董事比例、具有财务背景的内部高管董事比例和监事会规模与管理舞弊显著正相关,即地方政府的国有股国家委派外部董事比例、第一大股东所派董事比例、具有财务背景的内部高管董事比例较高及监事会规模较大的情况下公司内部治理机制无法有效防范管理舞弊。This paper makes a positive investigation on the association between the corporate governance and the management fraud from the aspects of equity structure,the operational mechanism of the Board of Directors and Supervisors.The research shows that the proportion of supervisors appointed by the first major shareholders,the equity ratio of supervisors and the frequency of supervisors attending The Board meetings are remarkably negative to management fraud when the equity property of the company is state-owned.However,the situation of two positions for one person,the proportion of outside directors appointed by the government in local state-owned shares,the ratio of directors appointed by the largest shareholder,the ratio of internal executive directors with financial background,and the scale of the Board of Supervisors are remarkably positive to management fraud.

关 键 词：上市公司 内部治理机制 管理舞弊 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]