高校群体性突发事件成因与治理的演化博弈模型  

Evolutionary game model of the causes and solution for college unexpected group events

作　　者：刘韵[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学数学与计算机科学学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《闽江学院学报》2009年第5期13-17,共5页Journal of Minjiang University

摘　　要：通过对群体性事件建立演化博弈数学模型,阐述了高校群体性突发事件的成因,并从数学模型角度详细分析了策略信息公开程度α、群体策略效用ω与采取各策略的群体规模θt之间的函数关系.通过对函数关系的研究,指出解决群体性突发事件应尽量避免弱势群体抗争策略成为其策略集的局部或全局最优策略,同时应适时增加或减少各策略的信息公开程度.By establishing the group events mathematical model of evolutionary game theory,this paper explains the causes of unexpected group events in college,and the perspective analyses the function relationships between information disclosure（α）,group strategy effectiveness（ω） and the group size of various strategies（θt）.The study pointed out that the solution of the mass emergencies events should try to avoid the fighting strategy to become local or global optimal strategy for vulnerable groups.It also suggests that increasing or decreasing the extent of information disclosure properly would be a better way to solute the college of mass emergencies events.

关 键 词：演化博弈 群体性 突发事件 高校 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学] F224.32