东北地区经济转轨中国有企业改革的演化机理与对策  

Reform Evolutionary Mechanism and Countermeasure of State-owned Enterprises in Northeast Region's Transition

作　　者：杨建华[1] 马涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院,山东烟台264005 [2]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2009年第11期25-31,共7页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70771061)&(70772027);国家软科学基金(2007GXS3D090);山东省科技攻关(2008GG30001003);华东经济管理.青年学者培育计划(Ⅲ期)(YOUTH-HDJJGL2009-03PM001)

摘　　要：文章将东北地区国有企业改革视为有限理性的政府委托人与国有企业管理层代理人之间缺乏有效监督的委托-代理关系制度演化过程。在相关研究的基础上,通过进化博弈模型来解释政府与国有企业管理层的交易与反馈如何因外部制度结构约束和行为损益的变化来推动东北地区国有企业的改革过程,从而不仅验证了理论框架,而且较为合理的解释了东北地区经济转轨中国有企业改革过程,同时也提出了相应对策。This paper regard reform of the state - owned enterprises as the lack of efficient supervisory consign - substitute relation institutional mechanism process between the finity rational government consigner and the manager of the state - owned enterprises. Based on the relative studies and through the evolutionary model to explain the how the trade and feedback to the change of outer institutional structure＇s leash and the behavior profit and loss of the management of government and enterprises. Which also promote the reform process of the state - owned enterprises in Northeast region. All above validate the theory structure as well as explain the reform process of state - owned enterprises in Northeast region＇s transition. At the same time put forward the correspond countermeasure.

关 键 词：东北地区 国有企业改革 转轨 演化机理 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]