私人创业风险投资的运行机制及博弈分析  

Study on the Operating Mechanism and Game Analysis of Private Venture Capital

作　　者：曹麒麟[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,成都610064

出　　处：《经济问题》2009年第11期42-44,90,共4页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY023);四川大学2006年度哲学社会科学研究青年基金资助项目

摘　　要：私人创业风险资本一般分批次逐步进入风险项目,其运行过程实质也是创业投资家和创业企业家的多阶段动态博弈过程。运用博弈模型,研究了双方在各阶段的收益情况和投资持续进行的限制条件,通过博弈平衡分析,为创业风险项目的持续高效发展提出了客观有效的建议。Generally speaking, private venture capital makes a series of investment on undertaking projects gradually. The process of the investment, in essence, is a process of multi - stage and dynamic game between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Based on a game model, this paper studies the revenue of these two parties （venture capitalist and entrepreneur） at every stage and the qualified requirements for sustaining investment. Then, according to the analysis of the game equilibrium, this paper gives several efficient suggestions to improve the development of the undeitaking projects.

关 键 词：创业风险投资 创业投资家 创业企业家 博弈 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理]