高管报酬与会计信息质量的相关性实证研究  

The Correlation between Compensation Incentive and the Quality of Accounting Information

作　　者：刘慧凤[1] 杨扬[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济管理》2009年第11期118-124,共7页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部社科规划项目"公司会计治理架构--基于嵌入性视角研究"(07JA630065)

摘　　要：报酬契约将经理层报酬与会计绩效或市场绩效联系,以及对高管报酬征收个人所得税,会激发高管层利用会计信息决策权进行会计信息操纵,谋取个人税后收益最大化。本文以我国上市公司2004～2008报表数据为样本,研究发现,报酬激励具有会计信息激励效应。企业盈利状况不同,盈余管理的方向和方式不同,且样本公司普遍存在基于薪酬支付避税目的盈余管理行为。Top-managers are rationality agent. The reward contract, which is associated with the ac counting profit or market performance, and the reward is levied individual income tax ,would give managers an incentive to manipulate accounting information for personal interests. We collected extensive accounting information on listed companies from year 2004 to 2008 as samples to examine the correlation between compensation incentive and the quality of accounting information. Our research suggests that an in centive pay system has an incentive effect to accounting information; companies choose different earnings management method in accordance with their earning performance. Earnings management is also used to a void certain tax payment, which is universal in all the sample companies.

关 键 词：报酬激励 会计信息质量 盈余管理 超常管理费用 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学]