多重委托-代理关系、公司控制机制与大股东通过关联交易掠夺  

Multiple Principal-Agent Relationships,Corporate-Control Mechanisms and Expropriation through Related Party Transactions

作　　者：朱至文[1,2] 汪金爱[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学中国经济研究中心 [2]淮阴工学院经济管理学院

出　　处：《中大管理研究》2009年第2期61-92,共32页China Management Studies

摘　　要：本文研究了大股东掠夺在公司治理与企业价值关系中的传导作用。在理论上我们明确了小股东、大股东与董事会之间的三重委托代理关系,并将掠夺概念化为小股东补偿大股东的代理功能而支付给大股东的租,建立了所有权高度集中体制下公司治理的外部控制机制和内部控制机制的理论框架。通过以关联交易作为对大股东掠夺的直接测量,本文用事件研究法证实了我国上市公司关联交易的负价值效应,并发现控股股东控制上市公司的能力、大股东之间的相互制衡、上市公司实际控制人的类型、对上市公司董事的股权激励以及上市公司股权分置情况是影响我国上市公司大股东掠夺的主要因素。本文还发现上市公司股权分置情况与控股股东的控制能力对大股东掠夺具有显著的交互效应。This study investigated the intermediation of expropriation in the linkage between corporate governance and firm value.We manifested the triple principal-agent relationships among minority shareholders,majority shareholders and the board of directors,and conceptualized the expropriation as rents demanded by majority shareholders to compensate their agency function in a theoretical framework of internal and external corporate-control mechanisms for firms with concentrated ownership structure.By using related party transactions as a direct measure for expropriation and the event study,we corroborated the negative value effect of expropriation in China＇s stock markets,and found that the controlling capability of controlling shareholders,ownership balancing,identity of controlling shareholders,stock incentives for the board/executives,and the proportion of tradable shares are significantly associated with expropriation.We also found an interact effect between the proportion of tradable shares and the controlling capability of controlling shareholders on expropriation.

关 键 词：掠夺 公司控制机制 企业价值 委托-代理 关联交易 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]