双重委托代理结构:逻辑起点、理论模型与治理要义  

The Dual Principal-Agent Theory:Logical Starting Point,Theoretical Model and Governance Implication

作　　者：严若森[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《学术月刊》2009年第11期75-81,共7页Academic Monthly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于双重委托代理理论模型构建的股权集中型公司治理最优化研究"(批准号:70502024)的资助

摘　　要：但凡在股权相对集中或绝对集中的公司或企业集团中,均严重存在大股东恶意侵占中小股东利益的现象。基于分散股权结构特征的传统委托代理理论或单委托代理理论无法对此类股权集中型公司治理矛盾的产生及解决作出令人信服的解析,构建双重委托代理理论,既能够对其作出合理的解析,也有利于股权集中型公司实现其双重委托代理成本的降低与全体股东利益的最大化。双重委托代理理论的逻辑起点在于基于股权集中的公司治理关系异化与股东利益协调均衡目标的实现,其理论内核在于股东与代理人等公司治理主体激励相容集的构建与代理人市场治理机制的优化,其治理要义则在于优化大股东的控制权配置结构与构建切实可行的中小股东权益保护机制。The phenomenon that the large shareholders viciously invade the minor shareholders is a prevalent existence in all of the companies or enterprise groups which are of relative equity centralization or absolute equity centralization. A reasonable explanation can be made by using the dual principal-agent theory mentioned in this paper. In the meanwhile, the dual principal-agent theory is propitious to the cost reduction of the dual principal-agent and the interests maximization of all shareholders. The logical starting point of the dual principal-agent theory rests with the relationship dissimilation of the corporate governance which is based on equity centralization and the achievement of the harmonious equilibrium aim of the interests of the shareholders. Its theoretical core rests with the construction of the incentive compatible set about corporation governance main body which includes the shareholders, the agents and so on and the governance optimization of the agent markets. Its governance implication rests with optimizing the configuration of the structure of control rights of the large shareholders and building a set of practical mechanisms to protect the interests of minority shareholders.

关 键 词：股权集中 双重委托代理 内部治理机制 代理人市场 控制权结构 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]