现金流权、控制权与资本结构决策——来自我国民营上市公司的证据  

Cash Flow Rights,Controlling Rights and Capital Structure Policies:Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies

作　　者：苏坤[1] 杨淑娥[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]上海对外贸易学院金融学院,上海201620

出　　处：《预测》2009年第6期18-23,70,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672054)

摘　　要：对我国民营上市公司资本结构、现金流权、控制权及其分离程度的现状进行了描述。对现金流权、控制权及其分离程度对资本结构的影响进行了理论分析和实证检验。研究表明:终极控制股东现金流权、控制权与公司负债水平显著负相关;控制权与现金流权分离的公司,终极控制股东倾向于债务融资,扩大其可掌控的资源,以便进行攫取行为。两权分离程度越大,这种动机就越强。公司负债水平与两权分离程度总体上呈现一种倒U型关系。This paper describes the financing structure, cash flow rights, controlling rights and the separation degree of them in Chinese private listed companies. We did the theoretical analysis and empirical test of the ultimate controlling shareholder＇ s impact on corporate financing policies. The results show that： the ultimate controlling shareholder＇ s cash flow rights, controlling rights are negatively related to capital structure. If the control rights separated from the cash flow rights, the ultimate controlling shareholder tends to increase the size of debt financing to expand its control of the resources which facilitate the expropriation. And this motivation increases with the separation degree of the two rights. O- verall, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between capital structure and the separation ratio of controlling rights and cash flow rights.

关 键 词：终极控制股东 现金流权 控制权 资本结构 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]