信息共享条件下供应链在线与传统销售渠道协调定价  

The Coordination Model for Online and Traditional Channel in Supply Chain under Information Sharing

作　　者：邱若臻[1] 黄小原[1] 葛汝刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2009年第4期74-78,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(70702037);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572088);教育部高等学校博士学科专项基金资助项目(20050145022)

摘　　要：研究了市场需求信息更新条件下,具有传统和在线销售的供应链双源渠道协调问题。建立了以制造商为主方,零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型,该模型实质是制造商在线销售价格与零售商传统销售价格之间协调;给出了需求信息共享和非共享两种情况下的供应链最优协调价格策略;分析了需求预测信息对供应链最优协调价格策略及其利润的影响;最后进行了数值计算,探讨了需求信息参数对供应链及其成员利润的影响。结果表明,信息共享下的供应链及其成员利润要高于非信息共享情况,而且,越精确的需求预测将导致更高的利润。The coordination strategy of supply chain dual channd with traditional retail and online sale under demand information updating condition is studied. The Stackelberg game model with manufacture as a leader and retailer as a follower is developed, and the essence of this model is the coordination between manufacture＇s online sale pricing and retailer＇s traditional retail pricing. The optimal coordinate price strategies of supply chain under demand information sharing and no sharing are proposed, and the impact of demand forecast information on optimal supply chain＇s coordinate prices and profit are analyzed. The numerical simulation is done to discuss the impact of demand information parameters on supply chain and its members＇ profit. The result shows that the supply chain and its members will gain much more profit under information sharing, and more precise forecast will result in much more profit.

关 键 词：供应链 在线销售 协调 信息共享 STACKELBERG主从对策 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]