基于方差模型的董事会改革效果评价  

Directorate governance reform and effect appraisement based on ANOVA

作　　者：张逸杰[1,2] 王艳[3] 唐元虎[1] 

机构地区：[1]海交通大学管理学院,上海200030 [2]国家电网公司,北京100031 [3]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《哈尔滨工业大学学报》2009年第10期276-278,294,共4页Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology

摘　　要：采用基于方差模型的实证评价方法,发现董事会独立性比例超过33%的阈值时,上市公司的盈余管理水平会显著降低,在此阈值以下,独立性大小和盈余管理没有显著关系;独立董事津贴对董事会的监督绩效没有显著影响;独立董事的监督作用强于监事会.政策结论在于:改革加强了董事会在公司治理结构中的作用,建议应进一步提高董事会独立性,改革独立董事的薪酬结构、引入长期津贴.A method for the appraisement of directorate governance reform based on ANOVA is presented. Analysis shows that boards with independence percentage over 33% will weaken the earnings management of firms ,while there is no evident corelation between the independence and the earnings management with the percentage below 33%. The relationship between earnings management accruals and allowance of outside directors is not found. This article suggests that the percentage of independent directors should be further improved, exorbitant allowance level be limited, and long - term allowance be introduced in order to improve the current situation.

关 键 词：公司治理 董事会 独立性 薪酬 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]