地方政府行为与地区产业结构趋同的理论及实证分析  

Local Government Behavior and the Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Theory and Empirical Analysis

作　　者：王燕武[1] 王俊海[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学宏观经济研究中心,361005

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2009年第4期33-49,共17页Nankai Economic Studies

摘　　要：首先利用一个不完全信息动态博弈的理论框架,揭示地方政府行为与地区间产业结构趋同之间的关系,认为在单一的中央政府依托相对绩效考核的晋升激励假设下,不同类型的地方政府会采取模仿战略来最大化自身利益,进而导致地区产业结构趋同。而放松假设后,地方政府的行为将出现分化。接下来,本文根据1999—2007年中国省际间工业产业结构相似系数的变动情况,对理论推导的结论进行实证检验,并得出:近年来导致我国产业结构趋同的关键因素并非地区间相对绩效竞争的结果,而是由GDP增长率等绝对绩效指标带来的晋升激励扭曲。此外,地方政府追求财政收益控制权的行为,将有利于地区产业结构的差异化。In this paper, first we build a theoretical framework of incomplete information dynamic game to reveal the inter-relationship between local government behavior and the convergence of regional industrial structure,and find that under the assumption of promotion incentive which only relies on a single relative performance evaluation of central government, different types of local governments will adopt the similar imitation strategies to maximize their own interests,and then it will lead to the convergence of regional industrial structure. But when relaxing some assumption,the behavior of local government may appear to division. Then ,we offer a empirical analysis to test the conclusions that derives from theory basing on the change of China＇s provincial industrial structure similar index in 1999--2007,and we discover that not only the result of relative performance competition between regions but also the distorted promotion incentives coming from the absolute performance indicators such as GDP growth rate is the key factor to lead to the convergence of China＇s provincial industrial structure.In addition,the financial gains pursuit of local governments will be conducive to the division of regional industrial structure.

关 键 词：模仿战略 地方政府行为 动态面板数据模型 不完全信息动态博弈 

分 类 号：F121.3[经济管理—世界经济] F224.32