公司治理中经理自主权的壁垒效应解析  

Research on the Entrenchment Effect of Managerial Discretion in Corporate Governance

作　　者：袁春生[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院,太原030031

出　　处：《管理评论》2009年第12期48-56,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目资助(70672054);山西省软科学研究项目资助(2008041049-02)

摘　　要：经理壁垒作为经理代理问题新的表现形式,是指经理未能寻求股东利益目标但股东却无法对其进行更替的现象。经理壁垒的存在会影响到公司治理的有效性。Fama&Jensen(1983)提出的经理壁垒假说认为经理持股能够引发壁垒效应,但是相关理论难以解释我国企业经理持股比例很低甚至"零持股"却同样存在壁垒现象的问题。本文突破现有研究仅从经理持股方面分析壁垒效应这一局限,选择经理自主权这一新的视角对经理壁垒的产生进行解析。理论分析和实证检验结果显示,经理自主权越大,越容易产生壁垒效应,自主权是经理壁垒产生的重要权力基础。本文的研究是对经理壁垒假说研究的拓展与深化。Managerial entrenchment is defined the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanism. Since Fame and Jensen put forward their Entrenchment Hypothesis of managers＇ stock shares, it is believed that managers＇ stock share is necessary for entrenchment formation. This paper breaks this limit and research the entrenchment effect of managerial discretion through the theoretica｜ analysis and empirical study based on the concept of managerial discretion, it is found in the empirical research that the more managerial discretion, the easier it is to form entrenchment. The formation of managerial entrenchment is based on managerial discretion.

关 键 词：公司治理 经理自主权 经理壁垒 壁垒效应 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]