基于信号博弈的供需双方委托代理模型研究  

Study on the Principal-agent model of Buyer-supplier Relations Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：王鑫[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2009年第23期7271-7275,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70772065)资助

摘　　要：为了研究供应链企业间由于信息不对称而引起的委托代理问题,从供应链的核心——买方-供应商的角度出发,建立了供需双方的不完全信息动态博弈模型。运用信号博弈的思想分析了买方和供应商的行为,并探讨了影响不同博弈均衡的因素和条件,为提高企业对供应商产品质量确定的效率和准确性提供有益的指导。To study the problems of principal-agent caused by asymmetric information of supply chain enterprises,from the perspective of the core relation of supply chain,buyer-supplier relation,an incomplete information games model is sets up.The ideas of signaling games is used to deal with behavior of two parties：buyers and suppliers,and analyzes different equilibrium conditions,which will provide the guidance to improve the efficiency and the accuracy of measurement of supplier s product quality.

关 键 词：供应链 委托人-代理人关系 信号博弈 博弈均衡 

分 类 号：F713.53[经济管理—市场营销]