公平偏好与薪酬激励:基于保险代理业的研究  

Impact Analysis of Salary Incentive based on Fairness Preference-Based on Study on Insurance Agent Service

作　　者：郭心毅[1] 蒲勇健[1] 张东风 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]中国太平洋财产保险股份有限公司,上海200001

出　　处：《商业研究》2010年第1期146-150,共5页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目<和谐社会的微观经济理论研究>;项目编号:07BJY017

摘　　要：传统激励理论依据代理人为理性人的假设前提,不能很好地解决保险代理的薪酬激励问题。行为经济学研究认为行为人并非纯自利的,在考虑自身物质收益的同时还会关注收入的公平性。基于行为经济学中的公平偏好观点,构建考虑物质效用和动机公平的委托-代理模型,研究保险代理人存在公平偏好时的激励机制。结果表明公平偏好会改变激励契约结构形式和激励效率,"互惠"是解决代理人道德风险、促进保险市场健康发展的有利途径。The experiments on behaviour economics indicate that all people are not egoistical, and they not only consider their own material gain, but also concern about the fairness of income. Based on fairness preference viewpoint of be- haviour economics, this paper studies a new principal - agent model with material utility and fairness preference and the incentive mechanism of insurance agent. The results prove that the fairness preference have influence on the contract structure and efficiency of incentive, and the reciprocity is better way to reduce the agent＇s moral hazard and ensure a sound development of insurance market.

关 键 词：公平偏好 委托-代理模型 激励契约 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]