相对业绩比较在风险投资中的应用  

Relative performance evaluation in the application of venture capital

作　　者：王有鸿[1] 费威[2] 

机构地区：[1]运城学院经济管理系,山西运城044000 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116023

出　　处：《科技与管理》2010年第1期128-133,共6页Science-Technology and Management

摘　　要：针对风险投资中存在的风险投资者和风险投资家以及风险投资家和风险企业家之间的双重委托代理问题,引入相对业绩比较,构造数学模型对影响努力水平等相关因素进行分析;同时利用两维度相对业绩比较,讨论了风险投资家如何通过报酬设计,减轻他与风险企业家之间的委托代理问题。研究表明相对业绩比较有利于解决风险投资者与风险投资家、风险投资家与风险企业家之间的委托代理问题,为风险投资者和风险投资家设计合理的激励机制、完善投资契约提供了积极的参考价值。In response to double principal-agent problems between venture investor and venture capitalist, as well as between venture investor and entrepreneur in venture capital, takes relative performance evaluation into the models to analyze the correlative factors which affect effort of venture capitalist level and so on. And this article discusses how venture capitalist designs the compensation contract to alleviate the principal-agent problem by two-dimension relative performance evaluation. The results show relative performance evaluation favors to solve principal-agent problems between venture investor and venture capitalist,as well as hetween venture investor and entrepreneur,and offers positive referenced significance for which venture investor and venture capitalist design reasonable incentive mechanism and improve investment contacts.

关 键 词：风险投资 相对业绩比较 激励机制 委托代理 

分 类 号：F069.9[经济管理—政治经济学]