基金管理公司内部治理及其效应分析——以开放式基金为样本  

A Research into Inside Governance of Fund Management Corporation and Its Effect: Taking Open-Ended Fund as a Sample

作　　者：肖继辉[1] 彭文平[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学会计系,广东广州530632 [2]华南师范大学经济管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2010年第1期105-112,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(08JC630030)

摘　　要：通过分析基金管理公司的内部治理对开放式基金业绩、规模和资金流的影响,发现一股独大、董事会规模、内部董事比例和督察长的设置具有负面的治理效应;均分股权、监事会规模、内部监事比例和投资决策委员会规模具有正面的治理效应;独立董事比例高虽能吸引资金流,但对业绩无影响。基金管理公司采用均分股权模式、扩大监事会规模、提高内部监事比例与独立董事比例等,是改善基金管理公司内部治理的有效途径。We explore the influence of fund management corporation＇s inside governance on open-ended fund performance, size and cash-flow. We found that the block shareholding of the largest shareholder, the size of board and percentage of inside directors have a negative governance effect; whereas the equilibrium of shareholding between large shareholders, the size of supervision committee, percentage of inside supervisor, and size of investment decision committee have a positive governance effect; the higher percentage of independent directors can attract more cash-flow into the fund, but have no effect on fund performance. The result indicates that by adopting the equilibrium shareholding model, enlarging the size of supervision committee, and enhancing the percentage of inside supervisors and independent directors, intensifying the overseeing function of monitors are effective mechanisms to improve the fund governance.

关 键 词：基金管理公司 内部治理 开放式基金 治理效应 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]