意向性:从心理学概念到哲学概念  

Intentionality:from Psychological Conception to Philosophical Conception

作　　者：刘建岭[1,2] 高申春[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学,吉林长春130012 [2]中州大学,河南郑州450044

出　　处：《平顶山学院学报》2009年第6期34-37,共4页Journal of Pingdingshan University

摘　　要："意向性"这一概念作为专业术语是从布伦塔诺开始的。他将"意向的"、"意向的内存在"这样一些概念引入到哲学和心理学中,并且认为"意向性"是心理现象所独有的一个基本特征,可以通过"意向性"来区分心理现象和物理现象。胡塞尔从布伦塔诺那里接受了意向性的学说,并对它加以改造。通过胡塞尔现象学的极力宏扬,"意向性"这个概念成为20世纪哲学最具影响力的一个哲学概念。As a specialty term, intentionality is advanced by Brentano. He brought intentional or intentional inexistence into philosophy and psychology, considered that intentionality is an basic character particular to mental phenomena, and that we can distinguish mental phenomena from physical phenomena through intentionality. Husserl had accepted the theory of intentionality from Brentano and reconstructed it. Through the utmost publicity of Hsserl＇ s phenomenology, the concept of intentionality has become one of the most influencing philosophical conceptions.

关 键 词：意向性 心理现象 物理现象 外感知 内感知 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]