产品质量规制中企业与政府的行为博弈——以“三鹿奶粉”事件为例的实证研究  

Research on Game Behavior of Government and Enterprise Quality Regulation:Based on the Sanlu Incident

作　　者：李峰[1] 万庄[1] 米强[1] 史红民[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872 [2]北京师范大学管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2010年第1期88-92,共5页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"科学发展观在完善宏观调控体系中的体现研究"(07&ZD005)

摘　　要：以"三鹿奶粉"事件为代表的劣质产品危害消费者权益的案件近来屡屡发生,给我国消费者造成了巨大的生命财产损失。低质量产品的泛滥反映了我国政府在质量规制方面的诸多问题与不足。"三鹿奶粉"事件的背后存在着企业与地方政府之间围绕产品质量规制的行为博弈。在存在"强—弱"规制和政府俘获的博弈过程中,地方政府不可避免地会对企业进行弱质监管和过度保护,从博弈结果出发制定有针对性的监管措施将有效提升我国产品质量规制的有效性。Like the ＂Sanlu Incident＂, many problems about poor - quality products came up recently. Consumers＇ rights had endured great loss in both health and property. The proliferation of low - quality products reflects the quality regulation of our government had many problems and shortcomings. Behind this incident,there is a game in the quality of regulation between the enterprise and the local government. By introducing a ＂ strong - weak＂ regulatory and the government captivity analysis, the game would result in a weak regulation and overprotection. Enterprise and government relations in the game could show some specific advice for government quality regulation to improve the quality of products in the market.

关 键 词：质量规制 政府俘获 博弈 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理]