政府与国有煤矿安全生产间激励相容机制的构建  

Construction of Incentive Mechanism under Work Safety between Government and State-owned Coal Mine

作　　者：肖兴志[1] 沈惠伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学公共政策研究中心/经济与社会发展研究院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2010年第2期48-53,共6页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目"中国煤矿安全规制研究"(06JJD630002);辽宁省教育厅创新团队项目"转型期中国工作场所安全规制研究"(2006T046);辽宁省高等学校优秀人才支持计划项目(RC-05-04)

摘　　要：由于国有煤矿受经济体制改革的影响较大,因此如何形成一种内在的注重安全生产的约束机制,是国有煤矿改革过程中面临的一大难题。本文通过委托代理模型来分析政府与国有煤矿企业的关系问题,并将模型加入了国有煤矿经营者接受安全生产合约,进行安全生产的概率约束参数,得出了政府与国有煤矿经营者都应着力于降低安全生产努力成本系数,以提高安全生产水平,实现双方效用最大化的结论。Being affected greatly by economic system reform, a great difficult problem faced by the reform process of state owned coal mine is how to form a kind of inherent tied mechanism of paying attention to the work safety. By using the principal--agent model, thispaper analyzes the relationship between the government and the state --owned coal mine. Furthermore, after adding a parameter of probability restraint to the model, which is about the probability for the operators of state--owned coal mine to accept the contract of work safety, we find that to improve the level of work safety and maximize the utility of both sides, the government and the operators of state-- owned coal mine should both focus on efforts to reduce the cost coefficient of work safety.

关 键 词：委托代理 概率约束参数 国有煤矿 安全生产 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]