基于委托代理理论的服务外包分析  

Analysis of Service Sourcing Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：赵成柏[1] 

机构地区：[1]淮阴工学院经济管理学院,江苏淮安223001

出　　处：《商业研究》2010年第2期56-61,共6页Commercial Research

基　　金：江苏省教育厅基金项目;项目编号:06SJD790047;淮阴工学院科研基金项目

摘　　要：委托代理理论和博弈理论,将委托代理过程分成代理人的工作结果可完全由工作情况决定和不可以完全由工作情况决定两种情况,分别建立有不确定性但可监督的委托人-代理人动态博弈模型和有不确定性且不可监督的委托人-代理人动态博弈模型,分析委托代理双方在委托代理过程中各阶段的风险和收益,从而找出两种模型中双方的激励参与约束和激励相容约束,得出一系列的激励模式。The principal - agent process can be divided into decision completely through work and cannot be solely decided by the work. The paper established the principal - agent dynamic game model that has uncertainty but can be supervised and principal - agent dynamic game model that has uncertainties but can not be supervised, and analyzed the risks and benefits in various stages of principal - agent process to identify both encourage participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraints of two kinds of models and derive a series of incentive models.

关 键 词：服务业外包 委托人-代理人理论 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]