国有企业集团内部资本市场运行效率:基于双重代理关系的分析  

The Efficiency of Internal Capital Markets in Chinese State-owned Enterprise Groups:An Analysis Based on Double Principal-agent Relationships

作　　者：谢军[1] 王娃宜[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,510006

出　　处：《经济评论》2010年第1期97-104,共8页Economic Review

摘　　要：本文选取深沪两地140家国有集团附属上市公司与100家非集团国有上市公司2003-2007年的平衡面板数据作为样本,从双重代理关系的视角实证分析了内部资本市场的运行效率。理论分析与经验证据均显示:(1)国有企业集团内部资本市场上的主导代理关系为管理层代理关系,而非控股股东代理关系,即影响国有企业集团内部资本市场效率的代理问题为管理层代理问题,国有控股股东由于"缺位"并没有将内部资本市场异化为其进行利益侵占的隐蔽渠道;(2)从集团总部层面来讲,内部资本市场能够有效配置资金,但从成员公司的层面来讲,总部与成员公司经理的代理问题使内部资本市场的功能受损。This paper analyses the efficiency of internal capital markets （ ICM ） in Chinese state - owned enterprise groups based on double principal - agent relationships. It considers the agency relationship between shareholders and managers not the agency relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the leading principal - agency relations in ICM. Choosing the balance panel data of 140 listed companies affiliated to state - owned business group and 100 state - owned listed non - group companies as a sample, this paper makes empirical tests to do researches on the efficiency of ICM. The results support this paper＇ s theoretical assumptions, which suggest that headquarters can effectively allocate financial resources, but managers in affiliated companies couldn＇ t make the decision about optimal capital allocation, and state - owned controlling shareholders haven＇ t use ICM as a tunnel to rob the wealth of minority shareholders.

关 键 词：国有企业集团 内部资本市场 双重代理关系 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]