我国公务员培训模式选择的交易成本理论分析  

An Analysis of Transaction Cost Theory on Choices of China’s Civil Servant Training Models

作　　者：马秀玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]兰州大学管理学院讲师,兰州730000

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2010年第2期67-70,共4页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“服务型政府与国家公务员制度建设研究--以县级政府为例”(09CZZ022);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“中国官僚代表性与政策偏好研究--基于东、中、西三省的实证分析”;兰州大学人文社会科学学科建设基金项目“中国公务员培训模式研究”(LZUGH08003)阶段性成果

摘　　要：长期以来,我国公务员培训任务是由官方的培训机构承担的,是一种层级制培训模式。20世纪90年代以来,我国公务员培训出现了市场化,存在着三种市场化培训模式:有限市场化、准市场化、完全市场化。本文运用交易成本理论的"区别性组合"逻辑,在一个培训交易双方博弈的框架内分析了影响培训模式选择的各种因素,并用实地调研的数据检验了这一理论分析。Traditionally, China＇ s civil servant training was undertaken by official training institutions such as party schools and administrative colleges, which is a kind of hierarchy training model. Since the early 1990s, China＇ s civil servant training has seen a trend of marketization. There are three types of marketized training models ： limited marketization, quasi - marketization, and full marketization. In a game - theory - like of framework, along with the representative fieldwork cases, this study applies the logic of discriminate alignment of Transaction Cost Theory in public management research to analyze how the key factors affecting the choices of civil servant training models.

关 键 词：交易成本 区别性组合 公务员培训 培训模式选择 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学] D035.2[政治法律—中外政治制度]