任务调度机制中代理的一种反社会性策略  

An Anti-social-oriented Strategy of Agents in Task Scheduling Mechanisms

作　　者：孙代强[1] 孙俊逸[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北工业大学计算机学院,武汉430068

出　　处：《计算机与数字工程》2010年第2期162-164,共3页Computer & Digital Engineering

摘　　要：任务调度机制中信誉度模型的设计用来应付代理参与者的自私行为。机制假定代理都是自私的,每个代理的目标就是最大化自身利益。但除了最大化自身利益,有的代理还会设法让其它代理遭受损失,这种代理称作反社会性代理,反社会性代理会尽量争取相对于其他代理尽可能多的利益。描述了代理的一种反社会行为,并提出了一种反社会性策略,反社会性代理可以利用这种策略减少其它代理的利益。In task scheduling mechanisms, the reputation model is designed to cope with the agent of the selfish behav- ior of the participants. Mechanisms assume that the agents are selfish, each agent＇s goal is to maximize its own interest. However, some agents may try to cause losses to the other agents besides maximizing self-interest. Such agent is called antisocial agent, it will try to gain as much profit as possible relative to other agents. This paper describes a kind of anti-social behavior of agents, and proposes an anti-social-oriented strategy, which can be used by anti-social agents to reduced the in- terest of other agents.

关 键 词：任务调度 反社会性代理 机制设计 维克里拍卖 相对损失 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]