需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究  

Study on Ordering Strategies of Retailer in Supply Chain under the Presence of Demand Information Divulgence

作　　者：张志清[1] 董绍辉[1,2] 西宝[1] 田丽娜[3] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,哈尔滨150001 [2]河北科技大学经济管理学院,石家庄050018 [3]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2010年第1期80-88,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY059);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0352)

摘　　要：针对供应链订货过程中的需求信息泄露现象,通过对比供应商在泄露信息和不泄露信息情况下的收益,研究了供应链需求信息泄露的产生机理。建立了需求信息泄露条件下订货过程中零售商之间的信号博弈模型,通过模型求解得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下零售商的最优订货策略和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了零售商的订货策略选择问题。最后,通过一个数值算例说明了有关结论的有效性。According to the demand information divulgence in supply chain ordering process, by comparing the supplier＇ s profits between divulging the incumbent＇s demand information and not divulging the incumbent＇ demand information, the mechanism of the information divulgence has been analyzed. Then, a signaling game model of ordering process between two retailers has been established and the existing condition of separating and pooling equilibrium and the optimal ordering batch and profits of retailers under these two equilibrium states have been solved. In addition, the ordering strategy choices of retailers have been discussed. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the relevant conclusions.

关 键 词：信息不对称 信息泄露 订货策略 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]