具有后发优势的不完全信息专利竞赛  

Analysis on Incomplete Information Patent Race with Second Mover Advantages

作　　者：蔡强[1] 曾勇[1] 夏晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第1期51-58,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20040614016);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"资助项目(教技函[2005]35号)

摘　　要：先发优势和后发优势会同时存在于专利竞赛中,它们的相对大小将决定两对称企业在专利研发投资时机选择博弈中所产生的均衡类型并影响企业的研发投资决策。考虑不完全信息和技术不确定性,引入信息披露及其滞后效应使得追随者和领导者分别具有后发优势和先发优势,建立实物期权投资决策模型。通过对各最优投资临界信念的计算和分析,结论表明,一定参数条件下,占先博弈和消耗战均有可能发生。信息披露滞后时间越长、技术不确定性程度越低、随机信号到达速度越快、信号质量越高,领导者先发优势就越明显,越易产生占先博弈;反之,追随者后发优势就越明显,越有可能发生消耗战。First and second mover advantages exist in the patent race simultaneously and these levels would determine the equilibrium types arises in the game of investment timing for patent R＆D between two symmetric enterprises as well as the investment decision in the process. Under incomplete information and technical uncertainty, it is essential to introduce information spillovers and lag effect for the followers and leaders to occupy the second and first mover advantages respectively as well as establish an investment decision-making model based on real options analysis. Through calculation and analysis of various optimal investment threshold beliefs, it is shown that both a preemption game and a war of attrition can arise for specific parameters of the model. The longer the lag time for information spillovers, the smaller the technical uncertainty, the faster the random signal received, the higher the quality of the signal will be, and the leader＇s first mover advantage will be more apparent, the possibility of the preemption game will be higher. Contrarily, the follower＇s second mover advantage will be more apparent, the possibility of the war of attrition will be higher..

关 键 词：后发优势 信息披露 不完全信息 专利竞赛 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]