非对称信息条件下的银行企业关系  

Bank Firm Relationships under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：杨俊[1] 吴健中[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》1998年第12期82-85,共4页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

摘　　要：研究了在不对称信息信贷市场中，存在银行企业关系时，企业在项目实施中间一旦发现项目可能收益大但风险更大时，倾向于自觉终止该项目．而没有银行企业关系时，企业却可能为追逐高利润而冒险继续该项目．银行为避免可能的损失而被迫贿赂（让利给）该企业诱使企业终止项目，但这会降低企业的努力．本文从定量角度研究了银行企业关系对企业的激励，从而指出银行企业关系的重要性．This paper studies that in a credit market with asymmetric information,when bank firm relationships exists, once the firm finds that both the payoff and risk of the project are high while carrying out the project, the firm tends to voluntarily close down the project. When there is no bank firm relationship, the firm may take a risk of continuing the project to seek for high profits. To avoid possible losses, the bank is forced to bribe the firm to stop the project, but this may reduce the firm's effort.The importance of bank firm relationships is shown up.

关 键 词：银行企业关系 非对称信息 贷款 企业 激励作用 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F830.5[经济管理—国民经济]